Generalized quantifiers as defined by Lindström can be considered as third order concepts preserved by isomorphisms, that is functions giving for every structure M a relation between relations over M -for isomorphic structures isomorphic relations (in the third order sense). On the other hand every such a concept can be considered as a quantifier. Therefore investigating formalizations of logics with additional quantifiers can be considered as a study of formalizations of those third order concepts.
On the other hand because a formula "there are infinitely many x such that φ(x)" can be translated preserving equivalence into
then by defining standadness of models for theories like P A we have:
Theorem 3. The theory of one binary relation in L(D ω ) is not recursively enumerable.
The theorems 1, 2 can be proved by elimination of quantifiers. The first theorem can be proved by reduction of all formulae (preserving equivalence) to boolean combination of basic formulae of the form: "X is power of t", and "n divides power of X 1 + . . . X s + t", where X i are so called components, that is if A 1 , . . . , A k are all unary predicates occurring in a formula φ; for : {1, . . . , k} → {0, 1} we define a formula X , being conjunction with k conjuncts such that i-th conjunct is
The second theorem can be obtained by generalization of known method (see Presburger 1929) -nontrivial part in this case is an elimination of divisibility quantifiers. However basic sentences of this elimination are the same as in a case of Presburger proof. In both cases we need the following lemma which holds for every unary generalized quantifier Q (particularly for D n , ∀, ∃). Lemma 1. Let Q be an unary generalized quantifier preserving equivalence, that is |= ∀x(φ ≡ ψ) → (Qxφ ≡ Qxψ), then 1. Let φ be a formula without free occurrences of x then |= (φ&Qxψ) ≡ (φ&Qx(φ&ψ)).
2. Let φ be a quantifier free formula then there are formulae ζ 1 , . . . , ζ k , ξ 1 , . . . , ξ k such that for i = 1, . . . , k ζ i is a boolean combination of atomic formulae with no occurrences of x, and ξ i is boolean combination of atomic formulae having at least one occurrence of x, and
Comparing these characterizations of L(D ω ) with those of L(H n ), L(H n ), L(F ω ) (pure logics with Henkin or function quantifiers) given in Krynicki-Mostowski 1991 we state the following:
Theorem 4. The theory of infinitely many unary relations in L(H 4 ) is not decidable.
We cannot state anything similar for L(F ω ), it seems rather that this theory is equivalent in L(D ω ) and in L(F ω ). In Krynicki-Mostowski 1991 it was stated that the theory of identity in both logics L(D ω ) and L(F ω ) is equivalent and decidable.
It is known also that full first order arithmetic with addition and multiplication can be finitely axiomatized in terms of successor function only in a logic L(F 2 ) (see Krynicki-Lachlan 1979) . Therefore the logic of divisibility appear to be essentially weaker than those of function or Henkin quantifiers.
Third order concepts even being too strong to be formalized within full second order framework can be represented by their weak versions (see Mostowski 1990 ). According to weak interpretation P A(D ω ) is equivalent to P A, then weak and strong semantics are essentially different (by the argument justifying theorem 3, the standard model of P A can be axiomatized by the statement saying that every formula x < y is satisfied only by finitely many x). However in arithmetic of addition all divisibility quantifiers are eliminable. Therefore in the last case weak and strong semantics for divisibility quantifiers are equivalent.
